Abstract At a competitive equilibrium of an incomplete-markets economy agents' marginal valuations for the tradable assets are equalized ex-ante. We characterize the finest partition of the state space conditional on which this equality holds for any economy. This leads naturally to a necessary and sufficient condition on information that would induce agents to retrade, if such information were to become publicly available after the initial round of trade.
Introduction
Consider a two-period single-good economy with incomplete asset markets. It is well-understood that competitive equilibria in this setting are constrained efficient in the sense that a Pareto improvement cannot be achieved by reallocating the existing assets ( [3] ), while being generically Pareto inefficient (see, for example, [6] ). In other words, at a competitive equilibrium, agents' marginal valuations for the tradable assets are equal when evaluated ex-ante, but are typically not equal conditional on the true state of the world, for every realization of the uncertainty.
This suggests that information that partially resolves the uncertainty will typically induce agents to rebalance their portfolios, if such information were to become publicly available after the initial round of trade. We show that this is indeed the case, and explicitly characterize the set of public signals that lead to retrade. Since retrading occurs after the arrival of information if and only if it generates disagreement among agents regarding the marginal value of assets, this characterization is closely tied to the events conditional on which asset valuations are equalized in equilibrium.
We define an equal-valuation event to be a subset of statesŜ with the property that, at a competitive equilibrium, agents' marginal valuations for assets are equal conditional onŜ for any economy, but generically not equal conditional on a strict subset ofŜ. Thus the set of equal-valuation events is the finest partition of the state space conditional on which agents' asset valuations are equal in equilibrium for a generic economy. We show that information that affects only the relative probabilities of equal-valuation events does not lead to retrade while, for a generic subset of endowments, retrade does occur if the information alters the relative probabilities of states within an equal-valuation event. For a generic subset of endowments, therefore, the latter condition is both necessary and sufficient for the information to lead to retrade. If markets are incomplete, the subset of public signals that satisfy this condition is itself generic in the set of all public signals.
While there is a substantial literature on trading in financial markets in response to news, little has been said on the characteristics of news that induces agents to retrade. A class of no-trade results can be traced back to [7] who show that the arrival of information does not lead to retrade if the initial allocation is Pareto efficient. This leaves open the question of retrading in a competitive economy with incomplete markets. In this setting, [1] provide sufficient conditions on a public signal such that retrade occurs for a generic economy. We generalize their result (in Theorem 4.3) by providing a weaker sufficient condition, for a broader class of public signals (including signals that induce a partition of the state space), and for an arbitrary asset structure.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the economy in the next section. In Section 3, we introduce the notion of an equal-valuation event and analyze its properties. Then, in Section 4, we consider a public signal observed by agents after the initial round of trade, and characterize the set of signals that lead to retrade.
The Economy
We consider an exchange economy under uncertainty with two periods, 0 and 1, and a single physical consumption good. Asset markets open at date 0. At date 1 assets pay off. Our aim is to identify the types of unanticipated public information that would lead to retrade, if such information were to arrive after agents have traded at date 0 but before the realization of the uncertainty. In this section we describe the basic environment, with no arrival of information. The economy is populated by H ≥ 2 agents, with typical agent h ∈ H (here, and elsewhere, we use the same symbol for a set and its cardinality). Uncertainty is parametrized by S states of the world. The probability of state s is π s (π s > 0 for all s, and s π s = 1). Agent h ∈ H has endowments ω h 0 > 0 in period 0 and ω h ∈ R S ++ in period 1, and time-separable expected utility preferences with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions u h 0 : R ++ → R for period 0 consumption and u h : R ++ → R for period 1 consumption. We assume that u h is twice continuously differentiable, u h > 0, u h < 0, and lim c→0 u h (c) = ∞; 1 the same assumptions apply to u h 0 . There are J ≥ 2 assets. Asset payoffs are given by the S × J matrix R, whose (s, j)'th element is r j s , the payoff of asset j in state s. We denote the j'th column of R by r j and the s'th row of R by r s (by default all vectors are column vectors, unless transposed). Thus r j is the vector of payoffs of asset j, and r s is the vector of asset payoffs in state s. We assume, without loss of generality, that R has full column rank J. Markets are complete if J = S, and incomplete if J < S.
We parametrize economies by agents' date 1 endowments
J be the vector of asset prices (date 0 consumption serves as the numeraire), and y h ∈ R J the portfolio of agent h. The consumption of agent h is then given by ω h 0 − p · y h at date 0, and ω h s + r s · y h in state s at date 1. Let y := {y h } h∈H . A competitive equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 Given an economy ω ∈ Ω, a competitive equilibrium consists of a portfolio allocation y, and prices p, satisfying the following two conditions:
(b) Market clearing:
Notation. In our analysis we use the following shorthand notation for matrices. Given an index set N with typical element n, and a collection {z n } n∈N of . We use the same symbol 0 for the zero scalar and the zero matrix; in the latter case we occasionally indicate the dimension in order to clarify the argument. A " * " stands for any term whose value is immaterial to the analysis.
Equal-Valuation Events and Risk-Sharing
In our characterization of the set of public signals that lead to retrade, a key role is played by the notion of an equal-valuation event, a minimal event conditional on which agents' asset valuations are equal in equilibrium. We formalize this notion as follows. Consider a partition of S given by {S 1 , . . . , S K }. For each k ∈ K := {1, . . . , K}, let L k be the subspace of R J spanned by the vectors {r s } s∈S k . We say that the subspaces L 1 , . . . , L K are linearly independent if k∈K k = 0, k ∈ L k , implies k = 0 for all k. Henceforth, we choose a partition for which L 1 , . . . , L K are linearly independent, and K is maximal.
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We denote this partition by S(R). The proof is in the Appendix. We will show below (Theorems 3.1 and 3.2) that an event S k in S(R) is a subset of S satisfying the two properties stated in the Introduction, namely that (a) conditional on this event, agents' asset valuations are equal in equilibrium, and (b) conditional on a strict subset of this event, agents' asset valuations are not equal at any equilibrium, for a generic (i.e. open and dense) 4 subset of endowments. Thus, for a generic subset of endowments, S(R) is the finest partition of S conditional on which asset valuations are equalized across agents in equilibrium. Accordingly, for a given asset payoff matrix R, we refer to S(R) as the equal-valuation partition and S k ∈ S(R) as an equal-valuation event.
If there is a state s ∈ S in which the payoff of every asset is zero, i.e. r s = 0, the singleton event {s} is clearly an equal-valuation event. It is useful to separate such zero-payoff states and denote by S the set of states s ∈ S for which r s = 0. Without loss of generality we can order the partition S(R) so that the first K equal-valuation events {S 1 , . . . , S K } are subsets of S , while 2 The same partition is employed by [4] (Section III) in order to characterize the degree of indeterminacy of equilibria with nominal assets. 3 The partition S(R) can be calculated by studying the equation system L(a) := s∈S asrs = 0, where a := {as} is a vector in R S . A subsetŜ of S is a union of equalvaluation events if and only s∈Ŝ asrs = 0, for every zero of L. By checking this condition for every subset of S, we can determine the partition S(R). 4 More precisely, given a subset E of Euclidean space, endowed with the relative Euclidean topology, we say that E ⊂ E is a generic subset of E if it is open and dense in E.
the remaining equal-valuation events each consist of single zero-payoff state. Moreover we can order the states in S so that the first S 1 states correspond to the event S 1 , the following S 2 states correspond to the event S 2 , and so on. Let R be the submatrix of R consisting of the first S rows (these are the nonzero rows of R), and let the dimension of L k be denoted by J k . Then we have k∈K J k = J (note that J k = 0 for k / ∈ K ). The following lemma shows that the partition S(R) is invariant to changes in asset payoffs that do not affect the column span of R. Moreover, R is column-equivalent to a block-diagonal matrix, with each block corresponding to an equal-valuation event S k , k ∈ K : Lemma 3.2 Suppose the asset payoff matrices R and R are column-equivalent. Then S(R) = S(R ). Furthermore, R is column-equivalent to
where
The proof is in the Appendix. Lemma 3.2 implies that for each equal-valuation event that is not a zero-payoff state a portfolio can be found that pays off only in that event. We say that an equal-valuation event S k is trivial if it is a singleton, and nontrivial otherwise. A trivial equal-valuation event consists of a single state that is either a zero-payoff state or an insurable state (i.e. for which the corresponding Arrow security can be replicated with the available assets), while a nontrivial equal-valuation event consists of two or more states, none of which is a zero-payoff state or an insurable state. In our retrading results, an important role is played by the completeness or incompleteness of the asset structure, in particular relative to the nonzero-payoff states S . We say that asset markets are S -complete if they are complete relative to S (i.e. if J = S ), and S -incomplete otherwise (if J < S ).
5 A nontrivial equal-valuation event exists if and only if markets are S -incomplete. Moreover, an equal-valuation event S k is nontrivial if and only if S k > J k > 0. 6 If S k = J k , the fact that rank(R k ) = J k implies that R k is column-equivalent to the identity matrix, so that S k is not an equal-valuation event unless it is trivial.
There are two traded assets, a debt claim on d with face value 2, and a residual equity claim. Thus the asset payoff matrix is
It is easy to verify there is only one equal-valuation event, i.e. S(R) = {S}.
Example 2. Consider the asset structure in Example 1. Suppose that, in addition to risky debt and levered equity, a riskfree asset is also available. Thus the asset payoff matrix is
which is column-equivalent to
Therefore the equal-valuation partition S(R) is given by {S 1 , S 2 }, where S 1 is a trivial equal-valuation event consisting of the single insurable state s 1 , and S 2 = {s 2 , s 3 , s 4 } is a nontrivial equal-valuation event.
An assumption commonly employed in the incomplete-markets literature is that the asset payoff matrix R is in general position, meaning that every J × J submatrix of R is nonsingular. If R is in general position, and markets are incomplete, there is only one equal-valuation event.
7 The argument is as follows. Since, all the rows of R are nonzero (due to the general position of R), and markets are incomplete, there exists a nontrivial equal-valuation event, which we can take to be S 1 without loss of generality. By the general position property, any collection of J rows of R, with J ≤ J, is linearly independent, so that we must have S 1 > J. But this implies that dim(L 1 ) = J. Hence there is no equal-valuation event other than S 1 . The converse is not true, however: the asset payoff matrix in Example 1 is not in general position; yet there is only one equal-valuation event.
Henceforth, we will take R to be of the block-diagonal form (3). Due to Lemma 3.2, this entails no loss of generality.
We now characterize risk-sharing at a competitive equilibrium in term of equal-valuation events. The first-order conditions for the utility-maximization program (1),
imply that
(5) Thus asset valuations (by which we mean the marginal rates of substitution between assets and period 0 consumption) are equalized across agents when evaluated ex-ante, i.e. at the time of trading. This is just the standard result that competitive equilibria are constrained Pareto efficient. In order to economize on notation, we let
and use the shorthand u
Since the subspaces L 1 , . . . , L K are linearly independent, the following result is immediate:
In other words, at a competitive equilibrium, asset valuations are equalized across agents not only unconditionally, but also conditional on any equalvaluation event (or union of equal-valuation events). It follows that if, after trading, agents were to receive a public signal that induces the equal-valuation partition, they would not retrade since their asset valuations are already equal conditional on this partition. Specializing Theorem 3.1 to an insurable state, we have the standard result:
For a generic subset of endowments, the converse of Theorem 3.1 is true as well, so that we can strengthen the result as follows:
There is a generic subsetΩ of Ω, such that at any equilibrium (y, p) of ω ∈Ω,
if and only ifŜ is a union of equal-valuation events.
Thus, for a generic subset of endowments, the equal-valuation partition S(R) is the finest partition of S conditional on which agents' asset valuations are equal in equilibrium. The proof of Theorem 3.2 uses the transversality theorem. Since we also exploit transversality in the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 in the next section, it is useful to summarize the argument here. Consider a function Ψ : R n × E → R m , where E is an open subset of Euclidean space and m > n. For e ∈ E, let Ψ e be the function Ψ (·, e). The argument involves identifying such a function Ψ , such that the desired result can be formulated as Ψ −1 e (0) = ∅, for every e in a generic subset of E. We show that the Jacobian D x,e Ψ has full row rank at all zeros (x, e) of Ψ , i.e. Ψ is transverse to zero. By the transversality theorem, there is then a dense subsetÊ of E such that, for each e ∈Ê, Ψ e : R n → R m is transverse to zero. It follows that Ψ −1 e (0) = ∅. In other words, the equation system Ψ e (x) = 0 has no solution since the number of (locally) independent equations m exceeds the number of unknowns n. A standard argument (see, for example, [2] ) establishes that the setÊ is open, and hence a generic subset of E.
Proof of Theorem 3.2:
We begin by characterizing a competitive equilibrium as a solution to a system of (locally) independent equations. Let g(y) = 0 and f (y, p, ω) = 0 denote the equation systems (2) and (4) respectively. The tuple (y, p) is a competitive equilibrium for economy ω if and only if it satisfies
which consists of JH + J equations, equal to the number of unknowns (y, p). The Jacobian of F can be written as follows:
where I J is the J × J identity matrix. The matrix D ω f has full row rank since R has full column rank. Clearly, D y,p g has full row rank as well.
We now proceed with the proof of the theorem. IfŜ is a union of equalvaluation events, equation (7) holds due to Theorem 3.1. To prove the converse, supposeŜ is not a union of equal-valuation events. Then there is a nontrivial equal-valuation event, which we can take to be S 1 without loss of generality, such thatŜ contains some but not all elements of S 1 . Hence we can write S 1 as the union of two nonempty and disjoint sets,Ŝ 1 := S 1 ∩Ŝ andŠ 1 := S 1 \Ŝ 1 . We reorder the set S 1 so that the states inŜ 1 appear before the states inŠ 1 .
Recall that R 1 is the first diagonal block of R corresponding to the equalvaluation event S 1 . R 1 can be partitioned as follows:
This matrix is column equivalent to a block-diagonal matrix whose diagonal blocks areR 1 andŘ 1 . It follows that rank(Q 1 ) = rank(R 1 ) + rank(Ř 1 ). Since S 1 is an equal-valuation event, the row spaces ofR 1 andŘ 1 have a nontrivial intersection, implying that rank(
we can pick j ∈ J 1 such thatr j lies outside the column span of R 1 (in other words, we can choose one of the first J 1 columns ofQ 1 such that it is outside the span of the last J 1 columns ofQ 1 ). We fix such a value of j for the remainder of the proof. Due to the block structure of R given by (3), the vector [r 
has full row rank J + 1. We will use this fact below. It suffices to establish the theorem for the first two agents, h 1 and h 2 . We will show that, for ω in a generic subset of Ω, there is no solution to the equation system
Since j ∈ J 1 , r j s = 0 for all s / ∈ S 1 , so that the sum overŜ in this equation system can be restricted toŜ 1 . Hence, the Jacobian D y,p,ω Ψ 1 , evaluated at a
The Jacobian is row-equivalent to
which in turn is column-equivalent to
where A is defined by (9). This matrix has full row rank since each of the diagonal blocks has that property. Therefore, so does the Jacobian D y,p,ω Ψ 1 , at every zero of Ψ 1 . Thus Ψ 1 is transverse to zero, and Ψ −1
The following result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.2: This result can be established directly for a generic subset of endowments using standard arguments.
Information and Retrading
We wish to describe the kinds of (unanticipated) information that will induce agents to retrade. We assume that the information takes the form of a public signal correlated with the state of the world s that agents observe after trading at date 0, but before consumption takes place, 8 and before the uncertainty regarding endowments and asset payoffs is resolved. We consider the class of public signals that take finitely many values. Accordingly, we fix a finite set of possible "signal realizations" Σ, #Σ ≥ 2, with a typical element of Σ denoted by σ. A public signal can then be described by a probability measure on S × Σ, i.e. by the probabilities π := {π sσ } s∈S,σ∈Σ ∈ R SΣ + , where π sσ denotes Prob(s, σ). Let π s := Prob(s) = σ π sσ , π σ := Prob(σ) = s π sσ , and π s|σ := Prob(s|σ) = π sσ /π σ .
Since a public signal is completely described by the associated vector π, we refer to π itself as a public signal. Formally, a public signal lies in the set
In other words, any public signal in Π is consistent with the uncertainty over fundamentals given by {π s } s∈S . The condition on the marginal distribution over Σ is without loss of generality. This specification admits a range of possible signals. It includes those that have full support, with {s ∈ S | π s|σ > 0} = S, for all σ. It also includes signals for which the support {s ∈ S | π s|σ > 0} is a strict subset of S for some signal realizations. A special case of the latter is one where the signal induces a partition of S.
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In the remainder of this section, we characterize the set of public signals that lead to retrade. Given an equilibrium (y, p), there is no retrade at π if and only if the equality of asset valuations which holds in equilibrium (condition (6) ) also holds at π, i.e. It is clear from (10) that a public signal that affects only the relative likelihood of equal-valuation events does not generate retrade. Agents' asset valuations remain equal after the arrival of such a signal. For example, a public signal that induces a partition of S that contains the equal-valuation partition S(R), or is equal to S(R), does not generate any retrade since it leaves the conditional distribution over S k unchanged for every k. More generally, if π leads to retrade, it must belong to the following set:
This is the set of public signals π for which {π s|σ } s∈S k is not proportional to {π s } s∈S k for some σ and some equal-valuation event S k . Of course, S k must be nontrivial for this to be the case. ThusΠ is empty if markets are S -complete.
On the other hand, if markets are S -incomplete,Π is a generic subset of Π.
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It includes both partitional and non-partitional information structures. In fact, among signals that induce a partition of S, the only ones excluded fromΠ are those for which the partition is (weakly) coarser than S(R).
If markets are S -incomplete, for the generic subset of endowmentsΩ for which Theorem 3.2 (and hence Corollary 3.2) holds, u h s − µ hĥ uĥ s = 0 for every state s in a nontrivial equal-valuation event S k . While the no-retrade condition (10) is not necessarily violated for every π ∈Π and ω ∈Ω, we show that an appropriate perturbation of either π or ω ensures that it is violated. More precisely, Theorem 4.1 establishes that, for every π ∈Π, retrade occurs for ω in a generic subset ofΩ (and hence of Ω).
11 Analogously, Theorem 4.2 shows that, for every ω ∈Ω, retrade occurs for π in a generic subset ofΠ (and hence of Π). Finally, Theorem 4.3 strengthens Theorem 4.2 by showing that retrade occurs for every public signal that is "sufficiently rich," in a sense that we shall make precise.
We say that an economy ω admits a π-retrade if at every equilibrium of this economy the public signal π leads to retrade for at least one value of σ. Theorem 4.1 Suppose markets are S -incomplete. Then, for any π ∈Π, there is a generic subsetΩ(π) ofΩ such that every economy ω ∈Ω(π) admits a π-retrade.
Thus for π to lead to retrade it is not only necessary that it belong toΠ but, for a generic subset of endowments, sufficient as well. As noted above, Π is a generic subset of Π that contains both partitional and non-partitional information. An example of partitional information that leads to retrade (in fact, for any ω ∈Ω) is provided in Example 3 at the end of this section.
Proof of Theorem 4.1:
Consider a π inΠ, and fix a σ and a nontrivial equal-valuation event, which we can take to be S 1 without loss of generality, such that {π s|σ } s∈S1 is not proportional to {π s } s∈S1 . Let
We claim that rank(Q 1 ) > J 1 . If π s|σ > 0 for all s ∈ S 1 , this is immediate from the following result, which can be deduced from Lemma 5 of [4] :
Suppose, on the other hand, that π s|σ = 0 for some s ∈ S 1 . LetS 1 be the set of states in S 1 for which π s|σ = 0, and letR 1 be theS 1 × J 1 submatrix of R 1 corresponding to these states. Similarly, letS 1 be the remaining states in S 1 , andȒ 1 the submatrix of R 1 corresponding to these states. Then Q 1 is row-equivalent tȏ
If we delete the rows ofQ 1 corresponding to the redundant rows of its upper left block, and also delete the rows corresponding to the redundant rows of its lower right block, we are left with a block-triangular matrix whose diagonal blocks have full row rank, and hence whose rank is equal to the sum of the ranks of the diagonal blocks. It follows that for the full matrixQ 1 , rank(Q 1 ) ≥ rank(Ȓ 1 ) + rank(R 1 ). Since S 1 is an insurable event, the row spaces ofȒ 1 andR 1 have a nontrivial intersection, implying that rank(
This in turn implies that the rank ofQ 1 , which is equal to the rank of Q 1 , is strictly greater than J 1 . Consequently the rank of
is strictly greater than J. Therefore, we can pick j such that diag s∈S [π s|σ ] r 
has full row rank J + 1. We fix such a value of j for the remainder of the proof.
Recall that the equations describing an equilibrium are given by F (y, p, ω) = 0 (equation (8)). We will show that, for a generic subset of Ω, there is no solution to the equation system
i.e. the no-retrade condition (10) is violated for the first two agents, h 1 and h 2 . The Jacobian of Ψ 2 is
where B is defined by (11). This matrix has full row rank since each of the diagonal blocks has that property. Therefore, so does the Jacobian D y,p,ω Ψ 2 , at every zero of Ψ 2 . Thus Ψ 2 is transverse to zero, and Ψ −1 2ω (0) = ∅, for every ω in a generic subset of Ω. This generic subset depends on π, which is a parameter of Ψ 2 . Moreover, by taking the intersection of this set withΩ, we obtain the generic subsetΩ(π).
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Next we present our second retrading result which involves perturbing probabilities.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose markets are S -incomplete. Then, every economy ω ∈ Ω admits a π-retrade for every π ∈Π 1 (ω), a generic subset ofΠ.
Proof:
Fix a pair of agents h andĥ, a nontrivial equal-valuation event S k , and a signal realization σ. It suffices to show that the no-retrade condition (10) is violated for these given values. Letŝ be a state in S k , and let j ∈ J k be an asset which has a nonzero payoff inŝ, i.e. r ĵ s = 0. Such an asset exists since no state in S k is a zero-payoff state.
Consider an economy ω ∈Ω. We will show that, for πŝ σ in a generic subset of the interval (0, πŝ), at every equilibrium (y, p), there is no solution to the equation system
and thus the no-retrade condition (10) is violated. For any choice of πŝ σ ∈ (0, πŝ), we can always choose {πŝ σ } σ =σ , so that σ πŝ σ = πŝ. Moreover, if πŝ σ is in a generic subset of (0, πŝ), a corresponding π is in a generic subset of Π. Clearly π must also lie inΠ, and hence belongs to a generic subset ofΠ. The Jacobian of Ψ 3 , evaluated at a zero (y, p, πŝ σ ) of Ψ 3 , is
Sinceŝ is not an an insurable state, u ĥ s − µ hĥ uĥ s = 0, by Corollary 3.2. Also, we have chosen asset j for which r ĵ s is nonzero. Hence the lower right block of (12) is a nonzero scalar. Moreover, for ω ∈Ω, we see from the proof of Theorem 3.2 that D y,p Ψ 1 has full rank, and therefore so does D y,p F , at all zeros of F .
Therefore, the Jacobian D y,p,πŝ σ Ψ 3 has full row rank, at every zero of Ψ 3 . Thus Ψ 3 is transverse to zero, and Ψ −1 3πŝ σ (0) = ∅, for every πŝ σ in a generic subset of (0, πŝ). This generic subset depends on ω, which is a parameter of Ψ 3 .
In Theorem 4.1, the no-retrade condition (10) is violated by fixing a π in Π and perturbing endowments. The generic setΩ(π) therefore depends on π. In Theorem 4.2, on the other hand, a violation of the no-retrade condition is achieved by fixing an ω inΩ and perturbing π. The generic setΠ 1 (ω) therefore depends upon ω. In our final result we consider economies inΩ, as in Theorem 4.2, and identify a subset ofΠ of "sufficiently rich" public signals, which does not depend on the economy under consideration, such that retrade occurs for every π in this set. A signal is "sufficiently rich" if it changes the relative probabilities of states in some nontrivial equal-valuation event S k not just for one value of σ (as is the case for every π ∈Π), but independently for a number of values of σ that exceeds the degree of market incompleteness, S k − J k , in the event S k . More precisely, we establish the result for the following set of public signals:
ClearlyΠ 2 is a generic subset ofΠ.
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Theorem 4.3 Suppose markets are S -incomplete. Then, every economy ω ∈ Ω admits a π-retrade, for every π ∈Π 2 .
13 The rank condition in the definition ofΠ 2 allows for the possibility that {π s|σ } s∈S k is proportional to {πs} s∈S k for some values of σ.
Proof:
Consider an economy ω ∈Ω, an equilibrium (y, p), a nontrivial equal-valuation event S k , and a π ∈Π satisfying rank(Λ π,S k ) > S k − J k . Suppose there is no retrade at π. Then, the no-retrade condition (10) holds for event S k , for an arbitrary pair of agents h andĥ:
which can be rewritten as follows:
By Corollary 3.2, u h s − µ hĥ uĥ s = 0, for all s ∈ S k . Therefore, the rank of
The theorem generalizes Theorem 5 of [1] . They impose a stronger full rank condition on the public signal; in our notation, their assumption is that rank(Λ π,S1 . . . Λ π,S K ) = S, or that the matrix (13) defined over S rather than S k has full column rank. Moreover, they only consider public signals that have full support, and hence do not include those that induce a partition of S. They also assume that there is an insurable state, and that for each state there is at least one asset whose payoff is positive in that state.
While in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 it sufficed to consider a public signal for only two values of σ, for example an appropriate choice of {π s|σ1 } s∈S k for which there is retrade conditional on σ 1 , and a corresponding choice of {π s|σ2 } s∈S k , π σ1 and π σ2 in order to ensure that π sσ1 +π sσ2 = π s for all s ∈ S k , Theorem 4.3 requires an independent change in information across at least S k − J k values of σ.
The setsΠ 1 (ω) andΠ 2 , i.e. the generic subsets ofΠ identified by Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 for which retrade occurs, are not nested in general. Then the equal-valuation partition S(R) is given by {S 1 , S 2 }, where S 1 = {s 1 , s 2 } is a nontrivial equal-valuation event and S 2 consists of the single insurable state s 3 . Suppose Σ = {σ 1 , σ 2 }. Consider a public signal that induces the partition {S 1 , S 2 }, i.e. the conditional probabilities over the three states are given by (1/2, 1/2, 0) for one value of σ and (0, 0, 1) for the other. This signal is not inΠ and therefore does not generate any retrade. On the other hand, consider a signal that induces the partition {{s 1 }, {s 2 , s 3 }}, e.g. with the conditional probabilities given by (1, 0, 0) for σ 1 and (0, 1/2, 1/2) for σ 2 . This signal does lie inΠ. In fact, it lies inΠ 2 since Λ π,S1 = 1 0 0
which has rank equal to 2, greater than S 1 − J 1 = 1. By Theorem 4.3, there is retrade for every economy inΩ. Of course, it is not necessary that the public signal induce a partition of S in order to generate retrade.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1:
Suppose there are distinct partitions {S k } k∈K and {S k } k∈K such that the subspaces {L k } corresponding to {S k } are linearly independent, as are the subspaces {L k } corresponding to {S k }. It suffices to show that the join of {S k } and {S k }, i.e. the coarsest partition contained in both {S k } and {S k }, which we denote by {S k } k∈K , also has the property that the subspaces {L k } corresponding to it are linearly independent. Consider¯ k ∈L k such that k∈K¯ k = 0. Since {S k } is a refinement of {S k }, we can group the elements of {S k } k∈K so that the cells {S k } k∈K1 are in S 1 , the cells {S k } k∈K2 are in S 2 and so on, with ∪ i K i =K. Thus we can write k∈K¯ k = i k∈Ki¯ k = 0. For each i, k∈Ki¯ k is in L i , and is equal to zero by the linear independence of {L i } i∈K . Moreover, each element of the sum k∈Ki¯ k belongs to a distinct subspace L j , and hence is equal to zero by the linear independence of {L j } j∈K . Therefore,¯ k = 0 for all k ∈K, i.e. the subspaces {L k } k∈K are linearly independent.
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
The matrices R and R are column-equivalent if and only if R = RX, for some J × J nonsingular matrix X. Let S(R) = {S 1 , . . . , S K } be the equalvaluation partition for R, and letR k be the S k × J submatrix of R consisting of the rows of R corresponding to the states in S k . Similarly, letR k be the S k × J submatrix of R corresponding to S k . Consider a vector a ∈ R S , and let a k ∈ R S k be the elements of a corresponding to S k . We have a R = a RX and a kR k = a kR k X. Now suppose a R = 0. Then a R = k∈K a kR k = 0. Since the subspaces {L k } are linearly independent, we must have a kR k = 0, for all k. It follows that a kR k = 0, for all k, and hence the subspaces {L k } are linearly independent. Moreover, since {L k } is a maximal set of linearly independent subspaces, so is {L k }. This establishes that S(R) = S(R ).
Assuming for the moment that all the rows of R are nonzero, we now show that there exists a J × J nonsingular matrix X such that RX can be written in the form diag k∈K [R k ] as asserted in the statement of the lemma. Let M k be the J k -dimensional subspace of R J that is the orthogonal complement of the subspace generated by {Lk}k =k . We claim that the subspaces {M k } are linearly independent. Indeed, consider m k ∈ M k such at k m k = 0. Then, k · k m k = 0, for all k ∈ L k . But k · mk = 0, for allk = k. Therefore, k · k m k = k · m k = 0, for all k ∈ L k , i.e. m k is orthogonal to L k . By the definition of M k , m k is orthogonal to Lk, for allk = k. Consequently, m k is orthogonal to R J , implying that it is zero. The same argument applies for all values of k.
Let X k be a J × J k matrix whose columns are a basis of M k . Thus every column of X k is orthogonal to every row of R that does not correspond to the states in S k . Therefore,RkX k = 0, for allk = k. Let X := (X 1 . . . X K ). Then RX = diag k [R k ], where R k :=R k X k , an S k × J k matrix. Since the subspaces {M k } are linearly independent, X is nonsingular. This proves that R is column-equivalent to diag k∈K [R k ]. Moreover, rank(R k ) = rank(R k ) = J k .
In the foregoing proof, the rows of R were assumed to be nonzero. If there are some zero rows, the same argument can be applied to the matrix R and the set K to show that R is column-equivalent to diag k∈K [R k ], and therefore R is column-equivalent to (3) .
